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 INTRODUCTION  
 
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”)1 to protect participants and beneficiaries of private 
employee benefit plans. ERISA imposes strict duties upon those who 
manage benefit plans and their assets.2 Although these people—
otherwise known as “fiduciaries”—are held accountable for breaching 
their obligations, the statute makes no reference as to whether 
fiduciaries can seek contribution or indemnification from others when 
found liable for breaching their duties.3 This is important because if 
such rights are not implied, then breaching fiduciaries may sustain 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). 
2 Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ 
general/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). 
3
 Contribution apportions liability among joint tortfeasors by requiring each to 
pay his proportionate share, whereas indemnification shifts the entire liability from 
one tortfeasor to another who should bear it instead. Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern 
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 866 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ill. 2007). 
1
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liability unequal to their share of wrongdoing.4 To date, federal courts 
of appeal are split as to whether contribution and indemnification 
should be allowed as equitable remedies under ERISA. 
Part I of this article briefly discusses the history and purpose of 
ERISA. Part I then presents the issue of whether ERISA co-fiduciaries 
can seek indemnification and contribution as equitable remedies in 
light of their statutory roles, duties, and liabilities. Part II analyzes the 
circuit split pertaining to this statutory issue. Part III then examines the 
recent Seventh Circuit decision in Chesemore v. Fenkell5 both 
factually and procedurally. Finally, Part IV argues that the Seventh 
Circuit got its decision wrong when it held the district court had the 




Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Studebaker automobile 
company was struggling to compete against the Big Three in the 
United States automotive industry.6 In an attempt to save the company, 
Studebaker increased the pension benefits7 it was promising to its 
employees on several occasions; however, Studebaker was unable to 
sustain these contributions.8 By the end of 1963, Studebaker ceased its 
automotive operations and terminated its pension plan, leaving more 
than 4300 workers and retirees without the pension benefits they had 
                                                 
4 Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under  
ERISA, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1543, 1543 (1992). 
5 829 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016). 
6 Roger Lowenstein, The Long, Sorry Tale of Pension Promises, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 1, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323308504579085220604114220?mg=id-wsj. 
7 “A pension plan is a retirement plan that requires an employer to make 
contributions into a pool of funds set aside for a worker’s future benefit. The pool of 
funds is invested on the employee’s behalf, and the earnings on the investments 
generate income to the worker upon retirement.” Pension Plan, INVESTOPEDIA 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pensionplan.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). 
8 Lowenstein, supra note 6. 
2
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been promised.9 The collapse of the Studebaker automobile company 
subsequently pushed Congress to undertake pension reform, which 
eventually led to the enactment of ERISA in 1974.10  
ERISA is a federal law that establishes minimum regulatory 
standards for employee pension benefit plans in the private sector.11 
These benefit plans include any plan, fund, or program that is 
maintained by an employer to the extent that it defers employees’ 
income up to their employment termination or beyond.12 This means 
that if an employer chooses to provide employee benefits—e.g., 
retirement income, hospital or medical care, vacation benefits, prepaid 
legal services, etc.—it generally has to comply with ERISA 
regulations and procedures. Notably, ERISA does not cover benefit 
plans that are established or maintained by governmental entities, 
church plans, or plans that are maintained for the purpose of 
complying with workers’ compensation, unemployment, or disability 
laws.13 ERISA also does not cover plans that are maintained outside of 
the United States for the benefit of non-resident aliens.14 
The main goal of ERISA is to protect participants and 
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans against fiduciary abuses and 
mismanagement.15 Congress attempted to achieve this by subjecting 
plan fiduciaries to numerous duties, liabilities, and standards of 
conduct.16 As discussed below, analyzing the roles and responsibilities 
of a fiduciary will contextually frame the issue of whether co-
fiduciaries can seek indemnification and contribution as equitable 
remedies under ERISA. 
                                                 
9 Terrence Cain, A Primer on the History and Proper Drafting of Qualified 
Domestic-Relations Orders, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 432 (2001). 
10 Id. at 433 (citing James A Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in 
the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 
BUFF. L. REV. 683, 686 (2001)). 
11 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
12 Id. § 1002(2)(A). 
13 Id. § 1003(b)(1)–(3).  
14 Id. § 1003(b)(4)–(5). 
15 See generally id. § 1001(a)–(c).  
16 Id. § 1001(b). 
3
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A. Who is A Fiduciary? 
 
ERISA reserves liabilities for both named fiduciaries and 
functional fiduciaries. A named fiduciary has the authority to manage 
plan operations and is specifically listed as a fiduciary in the plan 
documents.17 A functional fiduciary, however, is not listed in the plan 
documents. Similar to the authority exercised by a named fiduciary, a 
person is a functional fiduciary to the extent that he (i) exercises 
discretionary authority or control regarding the management of an 
employee benefit plan or the disposition of its assets; (ii) provides 
investment advice regarding plan assets for compensation or has any 
authority to do so; or (iii) has discretionary authority in the 
administration of the plan.18 As fiduciary status is not only determined 
by formal designations, courts must carefully evaluate all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the individual’s relationship with the 
plan. The key to determining fiduciary status is primarily based on 
whether the person exercises discretion over the plan’s assets.19 If an 
individual is deemed to be a fiduciary, then he or she will be subject to 
numerous duties and liabilities.  
     
B. Fiduciary Liability  
 
Fiduciaries are subject to various standards of conduct because 
they act on behalf of plan participants and beneficiaries.20 These duties 
primarily include (1) the duty of loyalty, (2) the duty of prudence, (3) 
the duty of diversification, and (4) the duty to follow plan 
                                                 
17 Id. § 1102(a)(2). 
18 Id. § 1002(21)(A). 
19 See Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d 
1007, 1040 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
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documents.21 As detailed below, a breach of any of these duties will 
generally subject a fiduciary to liability. 
 
1.  Duty of Loyalty  
 
A fiduciary’s duty of loyalty consists of acting solely in the 
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.22 This duty requires 
fiduciaries to act with “complete and undivided loyalty”23 with an “eye 
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.”24 
Moreover, this duty requires fiduciaries to act for the exclusive 
purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries, as well 
as to settle reasonable expenses for administering the benefit plan.25 
Additionally, the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to avoid placing 
themselves in situations where a substantial conflict of interest 
between the fiduciary and the participant may arise.26 The classic 
example of a fiduciary breaching the duty of loyalty is where the 
interests of the employer are at odds with the interests of the 
beneficiaries, and the fiduciary subsequently acts in a way that places 
the employer’s interests above the beneficiaries—e.g., self-dealing, 
acting contrary to the interests of the plan, or kickbacks.27  
 
                                                 
21 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (outlining the various fiduciary duties under 
ERISA); see Craig C. Martin et al., What’s Up on Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 
39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 608–609 (2006). 
22 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
23 Freund v. Marshall & IIsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
24 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). 
25 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
26
 Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 
1041 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
27 Martin et al., supra note 21, at 608; see 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2012) (describing 
transactions that are prohibited between a fiduciary’s plan and a party of interest). 
5
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2.  Duty of Prudence  
 
The duty of prudence, otherwise known as the duty of care, is an 
objective standard.28 A fiduciary must act with the same care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence as an objectively prudent fiduciary acting 
under the same circumstances.29 This fiduciary duty is intended to be 
very stringent.30 As such, federal courts have generally required plan 
fiduciaries to perform adequate investigations related to any 
substantive decisions affecting the plan, such as the risks of an 
investment, the qualifications of an investment advisor, and all other 
facts that would be deemed relevant from an objectively prudent 
fiduciary’s point of view.31 Moreover, the duty of care requires a 
fiduciary to understand the surrounding facts and circumstances 
relevant to the investment plan or the investment course of actions.32 If 
a fiduciary lacks the requisite knowledge to assess the prudence of an 
investment decision, then the duty of care may require the fiduciary to 
hire an independent professional advisor.33 Accordingly, the fiduciary 
should ask questions, consider the professional advisor’s suggestions, 
and then continue to act prudently when exercising his duty of care. 
The completion of a careful and impartial investigation prior to 
making an investment decision provides an adequate basis for a 
fiduciary’s defense.34  
 
                                                 
28 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More is 
Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 71 (1998); see Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 
F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the prudent person test under both trust 
law and the significance of employee benefits). 
31 See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 1983); see also, Martin et 
al., supra note 21, at 608. 
32
 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a–1(b)(1)(i) (2016). 
33 See id. § 2550.404a–1(b)(3)(i). 
34 Leslie L. Wellman & Shari J. Clark, An Overview of Pension Benefit and 
Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 665, 695 (1990). 
6
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3.  Duty of Diversification  
 
Beyond the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, ERISA fiduciaries 
must also exercise the duty of diversification.35 This duty requires 
fiduciaries to diversify the investments of a benefit plan for the 
purpose of minimizing the risk of loss, unless exercising such 
authority would violate a fiduciary’s duty of care.36 Although ERISA 
does not detail actual percentage limits for fiduciaries to abide by 
when diversifying their investments, this duty prohibits fiduciaries 
from investing disproportionately in a particular venture.37 A 
Congressional Committee report on the Act’s diversification provision 
stated: 
 
A fiduciary usually should not invest the whole or an 
unreasonable large proportion of the trust property in a single 
security. Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest the whole 
or an unduly large proportion of the trust property in one type 
of security or in various types of securities dependent upon 
the success of one enterprise or upon conditions in one 
locality, since the effect is to increase the risk of large 
losses.38 
 
Notably, there is no per se violation under the duty of diversification. 
Each case depends on its own unique facts and circumstances.39  
 
                                                 
35 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
36 Id. 
37 In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996). 
38 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5085). 
39 Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan 
Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013).  
7
DeBruyne: ERISA Remedies: Rethinking Indemnification and Contribution for C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
213 
4.  Duty to Follow Plan Documents  
 
Finally, fiduciaries have a duty to act in accordance with plan 
documents insofar as such documents are consistent with ERISA.40 In 
other words, fiduciaries cannot implement plan provisions that violate 
ERISA. Additionally, every benefit plan must be in writing41 and must 
(1) provide a procedure for implementing a funding policy that is 
consistent with the plan’s objectives, (2) describe the procedure for 
allocating fiduciary responsibilities, (3) identify who can amend the 
plan and provide the procedure for amending the plan, and (4) specify 
how payments are made to and from the plan.42   
 
C. Co-Fiduciary Liability  
 
ERISA fiduciaries may also be liable for the actions of other 
fiduciaries—otherwise known as “co-fiduciaries.”43 A co-fiduciary can 
either be appointed by another fiduciary or appointed by the plan.44 A 
fiduciary may be liable for another fiduciary’s breach if the fiduciary 
(1) knowingly conceals the other’s breach, (2) enables the other’s 
breach, or (3) does not make reasonable efforts to remedy the other’s 
breach if he was aware of it.45 As co-fiduciaries are jointly and 
severally liable for breaches of duty,46 federal courts encourage ERISA 
fiduciaries to take affirmative steps in remedying perceived issues that 
are related to plan operations.47 That is, a fiduciary cannot avoid 
                                                 
40 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012). 
41 Id. § 1102(a)(1). 
42 Id. § 1102(b)(1)–(4).  
43 See id. generally § 1105. 




 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2012). 
46 Id. § 1105(b)(1). 
47 See generally Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(Pooler, J., concurring); Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1984). 
8
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liability by simply doing nothing in the wake of another’s breach of 
duty.48  
 
D. The Arising Issue: Indemnification and Contribution  
  
The aforementioned provisions establish that fiduciaries are 
obliged to act in the best interest of plan participants and are jointly 
and severally liable for breaching their duties. Nevertheless, although 
ERISA expressly assigns liabilities to plan fiduciaries, the Act is silent 
as to whether liabilities may be allocated between two or more 
fiduciaries in relation to a single judgment. Section 1132 states that 
“[a] civil action may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a 
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under 
Section 1109.”49 Moreover, Section 1109 provides: 
 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who 
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties 
imposed upon fiduciaries . . . shall be personally liable to 
make good to such plan . . . and shall be subject to such other 
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary . . . .50  
 
Based on this language, courts are left to interpret fiduciary 
liabilities in light of the phrase “other equitable or remedial relief.”51 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Free, 732 F.2d at 1336 (trustee of plan was liable under ERISA for 
co-fiduciary’s breach where at no time did trustee take any action to determine assets 
of plan to asset control over plan assets or to assure that plan assets would be 
protected from losses); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 898, 909–
10 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (ERISA fiduciaries who did not allegedly participate in co-
fiduciaries’ breaches may still be liable if they have knowledge of, but took no action 
to prevent, co-fiduciaries’ acts); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 661–62 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (ERISA fiduciaries may be liable for 
failing to investigate the propriety of investments of plan funds made by co-
fiduciaries).  
49 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012). 
50 Id. § 1109(a) (emphasis added). 
51 Id. 
9
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Although courts have considered whether fiduciaries can seek 
indemnification or contribution as equitable remedies, the federal 
courts of appeal have taken various and inconsistent positions as to 
whether such remedies are available under ERISA. As described 
below, this contention is fundamentally based on how courts have 
answered the following two questions: (1) when should a right be 
implied under a federal statute; and (2) to what degree does ERISA 
incorporate common law trust principles.52  
 
1.  The Implied Cause of Action Theory  
 
The Supreme Court has recognized a right of contribution under a 
federal statute where (1) Congress created an express right of action or 
(2) through the power of the federal courts.53 As Congress never 
expressly addressed contribution or indemnification under ERISA, the 
question is whether this right should be implied through the power of 
the federal courts.54 In Cort v. Ash55 the Supreme Court devised a four-
part analysis for determining whether a right can be implied under a 
federal statute: (1) whether the party seeking the remedy is a class 
member for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is 
legislative intent to create or deny the implicit cause of action; 
(3) whether the cause of action is consistent with the underlying 
purpose of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action 
is one traditionally relegated to state law.56  
The Supreme Court relied on the aforementioned analysis in 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
57
 when it 
considered whether a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan was liable 
                                                 
52 See Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution 
Under ERISA, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (1992). 
53 Tx. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981).  
54 Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
55 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
56 Id. at 78. 
57 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
10
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to a plan participant for punitive damages caused by improper 
handling of benefit claims.58 In Russell, a beneficiary of an employee 
benefit plan brought an action to recover damages for improperly 
processing her disability benefit claim.59 The beneficiary argued that 
the fiduciary deliberately delayed processing her request, thereby 
aggravating a psychological condition that caused her back ailment.60 
The beneficiary then filed an action against the fiduciary seeking 
extra-contractual and punitive damages.61  
The Supreme Court held that Section 409 of ERISA62 entitles 
claimants to equitable relief, but does not allow parties to recover for 
extra-contractual damages.63 Based on ERISA’s statutory language, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that a fiduciary’s liability is “to make good 
to such plan” for breaching his duties.64 The Court noted that nothing 
under ERISA supported the conclusion that a delay in processing a 
disability claim gave rise to a right of action for punitive relief.65 
Rather, the Court reasoned that the statute’s language only concerned 
the misuse of plan assets, as well as remedies that would protect the 
plan, not the rights of an individual beneficiary.66 Furthermore, the 
Court stated that it was “reluctant to tamper with an enforcement 
                                                 
58 Id. at 136. 
59 Id. at 134. 
60 Id. at 136–37. 
61 Id.  
62 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (“Any person who is a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon 
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to 
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from 
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of 
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets 
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other 
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.”). 
63 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985). 
64 Id. at 140 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)). 
65 Id. at 144. 
66 Id. at 142. 
11
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scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.” 67 The 
Supreme Court also noted that courts should be cautious about reading 
remedies into a statute that Congress deliberately chose not to 
include.68  
Although the Russell decision suggests that implied remedies 
under ERISA are rarely found, the Court never expressly banned 
implied remedies beyond extra-contractual or punitive damages. As a 
result, the Russell decision stands as a pillar, as well as a point of 
contention, for the federal courts of appeal in determining whether co-
fiduciaries can seek contribution or indemnification under ERISA.  
 
1.  The Incorporation of Common Law Trust Principles  
 
A trustee is generally responsible for expenses improperly 
incurred by him on behalf of administering a trust.69 In the event two 
trustees are liable for a breach of trust, both trustees are entitled to 
contribution from the other.70 However, if one of the two trustees is 
substantially more at fault than the other, traditional trust law allows 
for the trustee who is not substantially more at fault to seek 
indemnification from the other.71 In other words, traditional trust law 
uses indemnification as a means to fully compensate a paying trustee 
where the other trustee is primarily responsible for the breach of 
trust.72 
The degree in which common law trust principles are incorporated 
under ERISA is heavily contested among the federal courts of appeals. 
                                                 
67 Id. at 147. 
68 Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 
11, 19 (1979)). 
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). For 
example, A and B are trustees for C. Both trustees participate in a breach of trust, 
resulting in a $1000 loss to C. If A paid C $1000 for the loss, A would be entitled to 
recover $500 from B.  
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
72 George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary Has 
No Right to Contribution and Indemnity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 9 (2002-2003). 
12
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This point of contention is, in part, fueled by ERISA’s legislative 
history, which provides that “[t]he fiduciary responsibility  
section . . . makes applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles 
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.”73 Although these 
principles apply to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,74 the duties 
of diversification and adherence to plan documents represent new 
obligations that have been altered to the needs of benefit plans.75 In 
light of such legislative ambiguity, the federal courts of appeal dispute 
whether the rights of indemnification and contribution should also be 
implied under ERISA based on common law trust principles.  
 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit  
 
 The Seventh Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to issue an 
opinion supporting indemnification or contribution under ERISA; 
however, the court sidestepped analyzing this issue under federal 
common law.76 In Free v. Briody,77 the Seventh Circuit addressed 
whether ERISA provides indemnification and contribution rights to 
fiduciaries.78 This case is an illustrative example of a fiduciary 
allowing a co-fiduciary to injure participants of a plan by failing to 
                                                 
73 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.C. 4639, 4649. 
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“The 
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such 
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in 
the interest of the beneficiary.”). 
75 Jay Conison, The Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys, 41 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1990). 
76
 Stewart H. Thomsen & W. Mark Smith, Developments in Common-Law 
Remedies Under ERISA, 27 TORTS & INS. L. J. 750, 756 (1992). 
77 732 F.2d 1331 (1984). 
78 Id. at 1336. 
13
DeBruyne: ERISA Remedies: Rethinking Indemnification and Contribution for C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
219 
take action, rendering both fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for 
breaching their fiduciary duties.79  
Free involved a corporation’s profit-sharing plan and two 
trustees.80 At one point, the primary trustee transferred plan assets to a 
purported financial adviser after being warned to exercise greater care 
over the plan’s assets by the trustee’s accountant.81 The primary trustee 
also withdrew securities from the profit-sharing plan to satisfy outside 
obligations.82 Throughout the course of these transactions, the co-
trustee did not monitor the plan assets and did nothing to protect the 
plan from losses.83 Thereafter, both the corporation and the primary 
trustee declared bankruptcy and the assets that were transferred to the 
financial advisor were never returned to the profit-sharing plan.84 The 
co-trustee appealed the district court’s decision, which held (1) both 
trustees were jointly and severally liable for the losses incurred by the 
profit-sharing plan and (2) denied the co-trustee’s claim for 
indemnification against the other fiduciary.85  
As for the liability issue, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the co-
trustee was jointly and severally liable for the plan’s losses.86 The 
court noted that the co-trustee could have easily taken action while the 
primary trustee was misappropriating plan assets.87 On the second 
question, the Seventh Circuit held that “ERISA grants the courts the 
power to shape an award so as to make the injured plan whole while at 
the same time apportioning the damages equitably between the 
wrongdoers.”88 The courts reading of Section 1109 was based upon 
                                                 
79 See id. at 1333–34.   
80 Id. at 1333. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1331. 
86 Id. at 1336. 
87 Id. at 1335. 
88 Id. at 1337. 
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ERISA’s legislative history.89 The court noted, “Congress intended to 
codify the principles of trust law with whatever alterations were 
needed to fit the needs of employee benefit plans.”90 Because the 
general principles of trust law provide for indemnification under 
certain circumstances, the court was able to extend its holding and 
indemnify the primary trustee under ERISA.91 
 
B. The Ninth Circuit  
 
After the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit was the 
first federal court of appeal to definitively rule against allowing co-
fiduciary indemnification rights under ERISA. In Kim v. Fujikawa,92 
Rodney Kim (“Kim”) was an official of the Pacific Electrical 
Contractors Association (“PECA”), a multi-employer bargaining 
representative.93 PECA entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 
1186 (“the Union”), which required employers to contribute to a 
benefit plan that was jointly administered by Kim and a union 
official.94 At one point, the union official improperly withdrew plan 
assets to pay Union-related expenses.95 Kim filed an action to recover 
all related payments, and the union official sought contribution under 
ERISA against Kim.96 The district court held that ERISA did not 
provide the union official a right of contribution against Kim, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.97 
The Ninth Circuit heavily relied on the Russell decision, holding 
that Section 409 of ERISA only establishes remedies for the benefit of 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1337–38. 
91 Id. at 1338. 
92 871 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1989). 
93 Id. at 1428-29.  
94 Id. at 1429. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 1432. 
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a plan.98 “Therefore, this section cannot be read as providing for an 
equitable remedy of contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.”99 
Unlike Free’s broad interpretive reading of ERISA’s legislative 
history, the court reasoned there was no indication in ERISA’s 
legislative history “that Congress was concerned with softening the 
blow on joint wrongdoers.”100 Moreover, the court reasoned that 
implying a right of contribution is inappropriate where the seeking 
party is a member of the class that Congress intended to regulate for 
purposes of protecting an entirely distinct class—e.g., ERISA plans.101 
 
C. The Second Circuit  
 
The Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to rule in 
favor of indemnifying ERISA fiduciaries under the federal common 
law, thereby forming the circuit split. In Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. 
Sovran Bank/Maryland,102 Fairway Spring Company, Inc. (“Fairway”) 
established a retirement plan for its employees.103 The plan allowed 
Fairway to appoint a trustee to exercise fiduciary authority over the 
plan and its assets.104 Chemung, the plan’s trustee, sued the plan’s 
former fiduciary, Sovran, alleging that Sovran breached its duty of 
care by continuing imprudent investments that were previously made 
by the plan trustee who preceded Sovran.105 Sovran requested 
contribution or indemnity, alleging that Chemung adequately failed to 
evaluate the plan, thereby contributing to the losses that were subject 
to the lawsuit against Sovran.106  
                                                 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 1433 (quoting Tx. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 
630, 639 (1981)). 
101 Id. 
102 939 F.2d 12 (1991). 
103 Id. at 13. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 14. 
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The Second Circuit first addressed whether ERISA permitted a 
claim for contribution or indemnity.107 After noting that Congress did 
not expressly provide for either remedy under ERISA, the Second 
Circuit quickly dismissed the implied action test devised under Cort v. 
Ash.108 The Second Circuit held that applying the Cort test would 
automatically dismiss Sovran’s claim because ERISA was enacted to 
protect plan participants and not former fiduciaries, such as Sovran.109 
As a result, the court addressed whether contribution or 
indemnification were available under the federal common law.110  
By incorporating the common law trust principles referenced in 
ERISA’s legislative history, the court held that the right to contribution 
was recognized under ERISA.111 Although the Supreme Court in 
Russell dismissed a plan beneficiary’s action to recover damages that 
were not expressly authorized under ERISA, the Second Circuit 
distinguished Russell on the grounds that the Court did not discuss the 
availability of federal common law remedies.112 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that Congress’s failure to articulate certain remedies did not 
necessarily mean Congress intentionally precluded such remedies.113 
Rather, it was more likely Congress simply lost focus of those beyond 
the protection of plan participants and beneficiaries.114 Based on these 
principles, the court held there was “no reason why a single fiduciary 
who [was] only partially responsible for a loss should bear its full 
brunt.”115   
 
                                                 
107 Id. at 15. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit under a 
federal statute, recall that the first part of the Cort test asks whether the party seeking 
the remedy is a member of the class whose benefit the statute was intended to 
protect. 
110 Id. at 16. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 17-18.  
113 Id. at 18. 
114 Id.  
115 Chemung Canal Tr. Co., 939 F.2d at 16. 
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D. The Eighth Circuit  
 
The Eighth Circuit, in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of 
America v. IADA Services, Inc.,116 is the most recent federal court of 
appeals to deny a fiduciary’s right to contribution under ERISA. In 
that case, IADA Services, Inc. (“IADA Services”) performed 
administrative and investment services on behalf of an association’s 
employee benefit plan.117 After the Department of Labor (“DOL”) 
conducted an audit, the DOL alleged that IADA Services violated its 
fiduciary duty by charging fees in excess of the plan’s direct 
expenses.118 The DOL claimed that IADA Services was a plan 
fiduciary because several trustees of the plan also served as directors 
for IADA Services.119 Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of 
America (“Travelers”), the insurer for the trustees of the plan, settled 
the claim on behalf of the trustees.120 Travelers then sued IADA 
Services, asserting claims for indemnification and contribution under 
ERISA.121  
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in Kim v. 
Fujikawa, holding that Section 409 of ERISA does not provide an 
equitable remedy of contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.122 
While the statute indicates that a breaching fiduciary “shall be subject 
to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate,”123 the Eighth Circuit held that the remedies under this 
provision are to the ERISA plan.124 Similar to the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Russell, the court reasoned that the Act only allows for 
the possibility of “other equitable or remedial relief” after it declares a 
                                                 
116 497 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2007). 
117 Id. at 863. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 864. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 866.  
123 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
124 IADA Services, Inc., 497 F.3d at 866. 
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fiduciary liable “to make good to such plan” and “to restore to such 
plan” any lost profits.125 Hence, ERISA could not be read to provide 
contribution in favor of a breaching fiduciary.126 Moreover, the Eighth 
Circuit noted that the statute’s “carefully crafted and detailed 
enforcement scheme provide[d] strong evidence that Congress did not 
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 
expressly.”127 Notwithstanding the authority to create federal common 
law under ERISA, the court was reluctant to alter a reticulated statute 
that is backed by a decade of congressional scholarship.128  
 
CHESEMORE V. FENKELL 
 
A. Factual Background  
 
In the 1990’s, David Fenkell and the companies he controlled—
i.e., Alliance Holdings, Inc. (“Alliance”), A.H.I., Inc. (“AHI”), and AH 
Transitions—were in the business of buying and selling companies 
with an employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”).129 In a standard 
transaction, Fenkell would fold an acquired company’s ESOP into 
Alliance’s ESOP, hold the company for a brief period of time, and then 
flip the company at a profit.130 Fenkell’s business model was entirely 
legal, assuming he complied with his ERISA fiduciary duties.131 
Nevertheless, Fenkell breached his fiduciary duties in a particular 
                                                 
125 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. (quoting Great–-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
204, 209 (2002)). 
128 See id. at 865. 
129 Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (“Chesemore I”), 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 
1012 (W.D. Wis. 2012); Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/esops.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012) 
(“An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a retirement plan in which the 
company contributes its stock (or money to buy its stock) to the plan for the benefit 
of the company’s employees.”). 
130 Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. 
131 Id.  
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transaction, where he methodically flipped Trachte Building Systems, 
Inc. (“Trachte”) shortly before the company’s stock became 
worthless.132   
In 2002, Alliance purchased Trachte, a manufacturer of self-
storage systems, for $24 million and merged its ESOP into Alliance’s 
ESOP (the “2002 Transaction”).133 All of the Trachte common stock 
that was held in the former ESOP (“Old Trachte ESOP”) was swapped 
for Alliance common stock, and the Old Trachte ESOP was 
dissolved.134 In exchange, the Trachte employees became participants 
of the Alliance ESOP, with accounts equal in value to their previous 
accounts.135 Fenkell projected that he could later sell Trachte for 
roughly $50 million in five years.136 
By the time Fenkell was prepared to sell, however, Trachte’s 
overall profitability was flat.137 By the end of 2006 and early 2007, 
Trachte’s sales revenues were steadily declining and no independent 
buyer would purchase Trachte on the open market.138  As a result, 
Fenkell offloaded Trachte in a leveraged buyout (the “2007 
Transaction”).139 Fenkell created a new Trachte ESOP, where the new 
Trachte ESOP bought back the Trachte shares from Alliance in 
exchange for a promissory note.140 Next, the Trachte employee 
accounts in the Alliance ESOP were spun off to the new Trachte 
ESOP.141 The new Trachte ESOP then repaid the promissory notes by 
transferring back the Alliance stock to Alliance.142 Fenkell essentially 
designed the transaction so that the accounts of the Trachte employees 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2016). 
134 Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1017. 
135 Id. 
136 Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 806. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 808. 
139 Id. 
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in the Alliance ESOP were used as leverage to purchase Trachte from 
Alliance.143 By the end of the 2007 Transaction, the new Trachte 
ESOP had paid $45 million for 100% of Trachte’s equity and incurred 
roughly $36 million in debt.144 
Trachte was unable to sustain the debt load that it incurred as a 
result of the 2007 Transaction.145 Trachte projected six months after 
the 2007 Transaction that it was unable to meet its loan covenants.146 
By the end of 2008, Tranchte’s equity was worthless.147 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
A group of current and former Trachte employees filed a class-
action lawsuit under ERISA, alleging numerous breaches of fiduciary 
duties by Alliance, Fenkell, the Trachte Trustees, and several other 
entities.148 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin found the defendants liable.149 Alliance and Fenkell argued 
they were only fiduciaries during the spin-off and, therefore, should 
not be held accountable.150 This made Trachte responsible for any 
decisions made with respect to the plaintiff’s accounts after the spin-
off.151 Nevertheless, the court found Alliance and Fenkell acted in 
fiduciary capacities throughout the entire 2007 Transaction.152  
The court reasoned that Alliance and Fenkell (1) arranged the 
2007 Transaction so that it would only benefit them, (2) ensured no 
one on the opposite side of the transaction looked out for the new 
Trachte ESOP participants, and (3) ensured that those on the opposite 
                                                 
143 Id. at 1054. 
144 Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 807. 
145 Chesemore I, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1013. 
149 Id. at 1054–57.  
150 Id. at 1052. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1054. 
21
DeBruyne: ERISA Remedies: Rethinking Indemnification and Contribution for C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
227 
side of the transaction would remain liable to Alliance and Fenkell 
should they not go through with the 2007 Transaction.153 Moreover, 
Alliance and Fenkell made no effort in determining whether the 2007 
Transaction was in the best interest of the Trachte employees.154 In 
short, the court stated it was a typical example of “heads I win, tails 
you lose.”155 As a result, the court held Alliance and Fenkell violated 
their fiduciary duties owed to the Trachte employee participants in the 
Alliance ESOP.156  
After an additional hearing, the judge ordered Alliance and 
Fenkell to indemnify the Trachte trustees because Alliance and 
Fenkell’s culpability greatly exceeded that of the Trachte trustees.157 
The court found that Alliance and Fenkell orchestrated the 2007 
Transaction and used their position of authority over the trustees.158 
The judge analogized: “Fenkell was the unquestioned conductor and 
the Trachte Trustees mere musicians.”159 The Trachte trustees were 
subsequently indemnified for any compensatory relief they were 
required to pay.160 Fenkell appealed to the Seventh Circuit, mainly 
contesting that ERISA did not permit the court to order 
indemnification among co-fiduciaries. 161  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision  
 
In addressing whether indemnification and contribution are 
equitable remedies under ERISA, the Seventh Circuit first 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has previously incorporated 
                                                 
153 Id. at 1052. 
154 Id. at 1054–55. 
155 Id. at 1052. 
156 Id. at 1055. 
157 Chesemore v. All. Holdings, Inc. (Chesemore II), 948 F. Supp. 2d 928, 949-
50 (W.D. Wis. 2013). 
158 Id. at 949.  
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 950. 
161 Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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trust principles under ERISA.162 The Supreme Court has defined 
“appropriate equitable relief” as “those categories of relief that, 
traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) were 
typically available in equity.”163 Based on this definition, the Seventh 
Circuit held the district court’s remedial authority under ERISA 
incorporated the law of trusts, which subsequently encompasses the 
power to fashion “traditional equitable remedies.”164 Based on this 
context, the Seventh Circuit quickly concluded that indemnification 
and contribution were among those remedies.165  
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that it already addressed this 
issue long ago in Free, where the court held that the protections of 
Section 1105(b)(1)(B) were not exclusive remedies under ERISA.166 
Free recognized that “Congress intended to codify the principles of 
trust law with whatever alternations were needed to fit the needs of 
employee benefit plans,” which included the right to indemnification 
under appropriate circumstances.167 In response, Fenkell argued that 
Free was “implicitly overturned” in Summers v. State Street Bank & 
Trust Co.,168 where the Seventh Circuit noted in passing that “a right 
of contribution” under ERISA “remains an open [question] in this 
circuit.”169 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit rejected Fenkell’s 
                                                 
162 Id. at 811; see CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011) (noting 
that ERISA commonly treats a plan as a trust and a plan fiduciary “as a trustee”); see 
also Tibble v. Edison Intern., 135 S.Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (“In determining the 
contours of an ERISA fiduciary’s duty, courts often must look to the law of trusts.”); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts 
often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to 
interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”). 
163 Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 811 (citing CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 439). 
164 Id. (citing CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 440). 
165 Id. at 812.  
166 Id.  
167
 Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 (1984). 
168 453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006). 
169 Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 812 (citing Summers, 453 F.3d 404, 413 (7th Cir. 
2006)). 
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argument, holding that Summers never mentioned Free, let alone 
overturned it.170  
The Seventh Circuit continued by distinguishing Chesemore from 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Russell, where the Supreme Court held 
that ERISA does not entitle claimants to punitive damages.171 
Although Free and Russell both interpreted Section 409 of ERISA, the 
Seventh Circuit held that Russell did not undermine Free.172 The court 
greatly simplified its reasoning, noting that an ERISA fiduciary 
seeking a right of indemnification is not equivalent to a plan 
participant seeking punitive damages under an implied right of action 
theory.173 Despite acknowledging the differences between Free and 
Russell, the Seventh Circuit failed to explain the distinction and 
quickly affirmed that the district court had the authority to indemnify 




Although the Seventh Circuit has supported the accessibility of 
indemnification and contribution as equitable remedies under ERISA, 
the court has never explicitly scrutinized this issue under the federal 
common law.175 Instead, the Seventh Circuit has analyzed this issue 
based on the lower court’s remedial authority. Recall that in Free v. 
Brody, the Seventh Circuit held “ERISA grants the courts the power to 
shape an award so as to make the injured plan whole while at the same 
time apportioning the damages equitably between the wrongdoers.”176 
Similarly, in Chesemore v. Fenkell, the court held “the district court 
had the authority to order Fenkell to indemnify the new Trachte ESOP 
                                                 
170 Id. 





175 Thomsen & Smith, supra note 77, at 756. 
176 Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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trustees.”177 This is unlike the Ninth Circuit, which definitively held 
that contribution and indemnification are not available remedies under 
ERISA.178 Although this distinction is subtle, it is important because 
the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether there is an 
implied right of indemnification or contribution under ERISA.  
The Seventh Circuit in Fenkell incorrectly held that the lower 
court had the authority to indemnify a co-fiduciary in accordance with 
the background principles of trust law.179 Allowing a breaching 
fiduciary, which has exploited his position of power to the detriment of 
benefit plan participants, to seek equitable remedies is not only unjust, 
but contrary to ERISA’s purpose. As described below, the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Fenkell is improper for two reasons: (1) Congress 
did not intend to incorporate such equitable remedies; and (2) 
contribution is an inefficient remedy that increases the cost of 
litigation but not the deterrence for breaching fiduciaries.  
 
A. Congressional Intent: A Closer Look at ERISA’s Language 
and Legislative History  
 
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court looked to congressional intent 
for purposes of creating or denying an implicit right within a federal 
statute.180 The Supreme Court stated that a right could only be implied 
under a federal statute if congressional intent can be inferred from the 
statute’s language, the statutory structure, or from some other 
source.181 Therefore, federal courts can only provide ERISA co-
fiduciaries the equitable right to indemnification or contribution if 
Congress intended to incorporate such rights. Analyzing ERISA’s 
language and legislative history makes it abundantly clear that 
Congress did not intend to extend such privileges to co-fiduciaries.  
                                                 
177 Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 813 (emphasis added). 
178 Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989). 
179 See Fenkell, 829 F.3d at 813. 
180 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
181 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985). 
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A review of the statute’s express language is crucial to this 
analysis. The relevant language under ERISA provides that any 
breaching fiduciary “with respect to a plan . . . shall be personally 
liable to make good to such plan . . . and shall be subject to such other 
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary.”182 Although the statute does not 
explicitly define “other equitable or remedial relief,” examining the 
entirety of this provision illustrates that Congress is emphasizing the 
relationship between the fiduciary and the plan, not the relationship 
among co-fiduciaries.183  
Specifically, the statute expressly characterizes a fiduciary’s 
relationship as one “with respect to a plan” where a fiduciary is liable 
“to such plan.”184 Immediately thereafter, Section 1109(a) provides 
that a liable fiduciary may be liable for other relief, such as removal 
from the fiduciary’s position.185 By reading Section 1109(a) in its 
totality, it seems clear that Congress included the “removal of such 
fiduciary” as one example of a plan-related remedy that is permitted 
under ERISA, not a remedy among co-fiduciaries.186 Moreover, 
nothing under Section 1109(a) expressly indicates that Congress 
intended to apportion relief among co-fiduciaries in the form of 
indemnification or contribution.  
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly held that the lower 
court had the authority to indemnify a co-fiduciary in accordance with 
the background principles of trust law.187 Although ERISA’s fiduciary 
responsibility provisions are shaped by the common law of trusts, the 
Seventh Circuit in Fenkell mistakenly assumed that Congress 
inadvertently omitted a co-fiduciary’s equitable right to contribution 
and indemnification. ERISA is the product of over ten years of 
congressional scholarship, making it highly unlikely that Congress 
                                                 
182 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012). 
183 Russell, 473 U.S. at 139. 
184 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
185 Id. 
186 Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. 
187 Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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simply neglected to include equitable remedies under the statute. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly supported this argument, noting that the 
statute’s “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides 
‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other 
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’”188 Moreover, 
the reasons for including some equitable remedies while excluding 
others—i.e., the right to contribution and indemnification—would be 
completely undermined if courts were free to supplement remedies 
under state law that Congress deliberately chose not to include. Given 
that Congress deliberately excluded a co-fiduciary’s right to 
indemnification and contribution, the Seventh Circuit failed to 
adequately consider ERISA’s congressional intent in reaching its 
decision. 
Regardless of the statute’s congressional intent, however, one may 
assert that if such equitable remedies are not implied, then co-
fiduciaries run the risk of sustaining liability that is unequal to their 
share of wrongdoing.189 Nevertheless, recall that in determining 
whether a right should be implied under a federal statute, the Supreme 
Court’s four-part test considers whether the action is consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.190 Here, not only 
does ERISA’s legislative history fail to address equitable remedies 
among co-fiduciaries, but implying such remedies in favor of a 
breaching fiduciary would directly undermine ERISA’s purpose. The 
statute was specifically designed to protect plan participants from the 
mismanagement of plan assets by requiring fiduciaries to adhere to 
various standards of conduct.191 Moreover, fiduciaries are subject to 
such liabilities because they act on behalf of plan participants and 
                                                 
188 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (quoting Russell, 473 
U.S. at 146–47)). 
189 See, e.g., Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (“There is no reason why a single fiduciary who is only partially 
responsible for a loss should bear its full brunt.”). 
190 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
191 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
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beneficiaries.192 It is the plan participant that suffers as a result of a 
fiduciary’s breach of duty, not the co-fiduciary. Therefore, granting 
equitable remedies in favor of co-fiduciaries would tilt the scale and 
contradict the purpose of ERISA. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Consider the Economic 
Inefficiencies of Contribution  
 
At its core, the right of contribution allows a liable defendant to 
recover damages from other liable parties.193  If exercised in 
Chesemore v. Fenkell, for example, Fenkell would have had the 
opportunity to recover damages from the other breaching fiduciaries, 
such as the new Trachte ESOP trustees. Although this remedy was not 
ordered by the court, the Seventh Circuit held the district court had the 
authority to order ERISA fiduciaries to provide indemnification and 
contribution to co-fiduciaries in accordance with trust law 
principles.194 From a policy standpoint, however, one major 
efficiency-based criticism with this holding is that allowing 
contribution among liable co-fiduciaries increases the cost of litigation 
without simultaneously increasing deterrence.195  
As previously mentioned, ERISA fiduciaries must comply with 
their primary duties—i.e., the duty of loyalty, the duty of prudence, the 
duty of diversification, and the duty to follow plan documents—for 
purposes of avoiding liability.196 A fiduciary may nonetheless be liable 
for another fiduciary for (1) knowingly concealing the other’s breach, 
(2) enabling the other’s breach, or (3) not making reasonable efforts to 
                                                 
192 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 2 
(2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/resource-center/publications/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf. 
193 Virginia Sur. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 866 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ill. 
2007). 
194
 Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2016). 
195 See Di Cola, supra note 52, at 1553. 
196 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (outlining the various fiduciary duties under 
ERISA). 
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remedy the other’s breach if he has knowledge of it.197 Hence, once 
one fiduciary complies with his statutory obligations, the other 
fiduciaries are encouraged to comply because any fiduciary that is 
subsequently liable for a breach would have to bear 100% of the 
damages.198  
Notably, providing a co-fiduciary the right to contribution under 
ERISA does not change this outcome.199 “So long as the sum of all 
tortfeasors’ expected shares of the total loss is 100%, the incentives for 
efficient accident avoidance are the same under contribution or no-
contribution.”200 In other words, the total damage or loss resulting 
from a breaching fiduciary or fiduciaries is always the same, 
regardless of whether the damages are apportioned by contribution. By 
analogy, it would be the same thing as asking whether one prefers 
eating a whole pizza, or the same pizza cut into eight different slices. 
Regardless of what you choose, the amount of pizza is the same, just 
as the loss is the same. Because each fiduciary will theoretically still 
comply with his statutory obligations for purposes of avoiding 
liability, contribution does not change the overall level of deterrence. 
The only thing that does change, however, is the transaction costs 
among multiple injurers.201 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did not 
take this into consideration in reaching its decision.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The issue of whether ERISA co-fiduciaries can seek contribution 
and indemnification as equitable remedies is a question of statutory 
interpretation. ERISA expressly assigns liabilities to plan fiduciaries, 
yet fails to include whether fiduciary liabilities may be allocated 
among other parties in relation to a single judgment. ERISA’s 
legislative history similarly lacks any explanation or reference to this 
                                                 
197 Id. § 1105(a). 
198 See Di Cola, supra note 52, at 1553. 
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issue. Moreover, the few federal courts of appeal that have addressed 
this issue have taken various and inconsistent positions as to whether 
such remedies should be implied.    
The Seventh Circuit in Fenkell recently ruled on this issue, where 
it incorrectly held that the lower court had the authority to indemnify 
co-fiduciaries under ERISA.202 Although ERISA incorporates certain 
aspects of trust law principles, it does not include all of them—i.e., the 
right to contribution and indemnification. The statute was objectively 
designed to protect participants and beneficiaries in employee benefit 
plans from fiduciary mismanagement. A plain reading of the statute 
further supports this argument, where Congress clearly highlighted the 
relational concern between fiduciaries and their respective plans, 
rather than the relationship between co-fiduciaries. The fact that 
Congress chose to include some equitable remedies and not others is 
further evidence that such remedies were purposely omitted.203 As a 
result, the Seventh Circuit’s failure to properly incorporate the 
meaning of ERISA’s language and legislative history contravenes 
Congress’s intent and risks subjecting lower courts to unnecessary 
litigation costs in the future.  
 
                                                 
202 See Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2016). 
203 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012). 
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